Telling your AI "fix my security vulnerabilities" won't actually fix them.
Why AI Can't Fix Your Security Problems
Here's the uncomfortable truth: telling your AI "fix my security vulnerabilities" won't actually fix them. While AI tools excel at generating syntactically correct code, most security vulnerabilities exist in misconfigured databases and infrastructure, not in your application code.
Your AI-generated code might be perfect, but if your Supabase RLS policies allow users to update their own subscription status, or your database is publicly accessible, or your API keys are hardcoded, your entire application is compromised. AI can't see or fix these infrastructure-level misconfigurations.
The same vulnerabilities keep appearing in "vibe-coded" apps, even as LLM models get smarter. This isn't because AI is incapable. It's because security testing requires systematic analysis of your entire application stack, not just code generation.
That's exactly why I created SecureVibing Tools to automatically test your database configurations, RLS policies, and infrastructure settings for these exact vulnerabilities without relying on AI. Our non-AI based scanning tools identify the hidden security gaps in your Supabase setup, cloud configurations, and database permissions that AI coding assistants completely miss.
The Supabase Security Trap
Here's the flow I see over and over again:
- 1 Developer creates a table (usually called "profiles") with columns for "credits" or "subscription"
- 2 They push to production
- 3 Supabase shows a security warning about enabling RLS (Row Level Security)
- 4 They enable RLS and think they're secure
- 5 But their RLS rules are completely wrong
The Fatal RLS Mistake
The most common RLS rule I see is: "Users can view and update their own profile". Sounds reasonable, right?
Wrong.
This means users can update their own credits and subscription tier. They can literally add credits to their account as easily as editing their name. It's like giving someone the keys to your bank vault and saying "just don't take too much."
🚨 Real Example
I've seen $20k+ MRR apps where users could literally change their subscription from "free" to "premium" by editing their profile. No payment required, no verification, just a simple database update.
Why This Keeps Happening
1. AI Tools Don't Understand Business Logic
AI can generate syntactically correct RLS policies, but it doesn't understand the business implications. It doesn't know that "credits" should be protected differently than "name" or "email".
2. The "Good Enough" Mentality
When Supabase shows that security warning, developers think "okay, I'll enable RLS" and consider the job done. They don't realize that RLS is just the beginning, not the end of security.
3. Lack of Security Education
Most indie hackers and bootstrappers are focused on building features, not security. They don't understand the difference between "users can update their profile" and "users can update their profile data but not their subscription status".
4. The Vibe Coding Problem
"Vibe coding" is great for rapid prototyping, but it often skips the security considerations that should be built in from the start. By the time developers realize they need proper security, they've already built a vulnerable system.
The 90% Supabase Problem
In my experience, 90% of these mistakes are related to Supabase. Here's why:
Easy to get started
Supabase makes it incredibly easy to build apps quickly
RLS complexity
Row Level Security is powerful but complex to implement correctly
Default behaviors
The default RLS policies often seem reasonable but are actually dangerous
Documentation gaps
The security implications aren't always clear in the documentation
What Should Happen Instead
Proper RLS Implementation
Instead of "users can update their own profile", the rules should be:
- ✓ Users can view their own profile
- ✓ Users can update their name, email, and other non-sensitive data
- ✗ Only the application can update credits and subscription status
- ✗ Credits can only be decremented, never incremented by user actions
Server-Side Validation
Critical business logic should always be validated on the server side, not just in the database. The application should verify that a user has permission to perform an action before allowing it.
Regular Security Audits
Developers should regularly audit their RLS policies and test them with different user scenarios. What happens when a user tries to update their credits? What happens when they try to change their subscription tier?
The Bigger Picture
This isn't just about Supabase or RLS. It's about a fundamental gap in how we approach security in rapid development. AI tools are getting better at generating code, but they're not getting better at understanding the security implications of that code.
As more people use AI to build apps faster, we need to ensure that security considerations keep pace. The tools are there, but the education and awareness aren't.
🎯 Key Takeaway
Enabling RLS is just the first step. The real security work happens in understanding what your RLS policies actually allow and ensuring they align with your business logic. Don't let "good enough" security become "good enough to get hacked."